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2007-08-06 Unilateral US strikes in Pakistan's tribal regions would be devastating.
The Taliban is re-supplying from across the border in Pakistan, increasing tensions between the Islamabad and Kabul, as the strength of the radical Sunni movement grows in its traditional Pashtun heartland that straddles the Durand Line. In a combination of hard power and soft power threats, the US is attempting to resolve what it sees as the growing problem of Pakistan's president, General Pervez Musharraf - a key but seemingly half-hearted ally in the "war on terror." In a soft power threat, the US Congress on 27 July passed a bill making US aid to Pakistan contingent on Islamabad's efforts to fight extremist groups operating on its territory, particularly those launching operations across the Durand Line in Afghanistan. The bill also conditions aid on free and fair elections in 2008 and the restoration of democracy after eight years of military rule. The US has wholeheartedly backed military rule through Musharraf, until very recently. But it is the prerogative of a superpower to change its mind when it is clear that it has played it cards foolishly. While the congressional bill could see some progress towards restoring democracy in Pakistan and reining in Musharraf, hard power threats, through intimations in July that the US is considering unilateral strikes on Pakistan's tribal areas, would plunge the region into even greater turmoil. The Taliban has been re-supplying from across the border in Pakistan's troubled North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and there are plenty of indications that this area, as well as Waziristan - which are out of Islamabad's control for all intents and purposes - are safe-havens for al-Qaida-linked forces. Musharraf has been ineffective in regaining control over these territories and in many cases some say he has been playing both sides of the conflict. Troubled tribal territories For decades, the Pashtun border lands have been a safe haven for Islamist militants. The NWFP and South and North Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), were main supply routes for mujahideen fighting against the Soviets who invaded Afghanistan in the 1980s. The Pashtun are the main ethnic group within the Taliban, which is rumored to have received significant support from Pakistani intelligence. These regions are largely out of Islamabad's control and the local power structures have been taken over by the Taliban and its sympathizers. Their power has been increased by an influx of foreign fighters - Uzbeks, Uighurs, Arabs and Chechens - since the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The delineation of the Afghan-Pakistani border remains a major problem in securing the area. Afghanistan does not recognize the 2,640-kilimeter Durand Line drawn up by Britain in the 1890s, which dangerously divides the Pashtuns. The failure to secure this rugged, porous and largely inaccessible terrain has led to an increase in cross-border attacks against US, NATO and Afghan forces on the other side of the Durand Line. US forces have already launched attacks in Pakistan's tribal regions, targeting suspected militant hideouts. These attacks have been largely conducted through the use of US drones and intended to eliminate specific militant targets in the tribal areas. Though Islamabad has denied any knowledge of most of these operations, Washington has indicated otherwise. Last September, Musharraf struck a deal with the tribal areas to stand down Pakistani troops and embark on reconstruction and development in an apparent attempt to win the hearts and minds of the local population. The plan, while fundamentally the only way to resolve the crisis, was a failure that arguably gave militants time to regroup and the freedom to re-supply. The end result was that the Taliban seemed to usurp power from the local authorities. Following the bloody 10 July military operation in Islamabad against the Red Mosque, Musharraf's peace accord with Waziristan was abruptly ended and revenge attacks have begun in full force. Far-reaching consequences Despite the facts on the ground in Pakistan's tribal regions, unilateral US strikes would have consequences much more far-reaching than the benefits of taking out militant hideouts. Locally, there would surely be civilian casualties if the US were to embark on an offensive in Pakistan's tribal regions. Its lower-level attacks there have already led to innocent deaths that have sparked outrage and protests across Pakistan. Any unilateral attacks would lead to massive unrest among the majority Pashtuns in the region and further wrest the area from Islamabad's control. That unrest would undoubtedly also reach as far as the capital, Islamabad, where anti-American sentiment continues to grow. And Islamic extremists would capitalize on this sentiment to boost their ranks and strengthen their position. Moreover, with general elections due in October and presidential elections due next year, a unilateral US campaign in the tribal regions could radicalize the electorate at a very inopportune time and, assuming elections could be free and fair, destroy Musharraf's chances of returning to power. Already there are calls for Pakistan to break off relations with the US, and Musharraf is largely seen as Washington's puppet at home due to the violation of sovereignty inherent in the US strikes. While many would rightly argue that in the name of democracy and an end to military rule, Musharraf should no longer be in power, the more pertinent question is who would replace him and what would this mean for the troubled tribal regions. The consequences could also resound further away. Such attacks could also resound in Iran, which would perceive that if the US is willing to launch attacks in an allied state, what would stop it from attacking Iran should the current diplomatic process collapse. Iran sees itself as hedged in by US airbases and carrier-borne aircraft and knows that if an attack comes, it will be from the air. In Afghanistan, Karzai - who continually pressures the US to take a harder stance against Pakistan and frequently exchanges jibes with Musharraf about failing to secure the border and allowing militants to use its territory as a base to launch attacks in Afghanistan - might welcome such a unilateral US move against Pakistan's tribal areas. However, the celebration would be short-lived. The only real benefit to Karzai, whose authority has been severely undermined by increased militant attacks and sloppy US responses that have led to civilian deaths, would be a temporary boost to his image. Any US military operation would have to focus on specific targets where militant leaders are known to be hiding out, but this would do little to put a dent in the cross-border attacks on Afghanistan. And this also begs the question of who the targets are, aside from the clearly identified militant leaders. The majority population in the area is Pashtun. There is not much a military campaign can do other than to foment further unrest and anti-American sentiment. The most important issue to be resolved in the immediate future is the dispute concerning the Durand Line. Bringing Afghanistan and Pakistan together on this point is the first step toward any semblance of peace. In the longer term, the grievances in the marginalized and underdeveloped Pashtun regions must be adequately addressed for any enduring cessation of violence. Should the US launch further attacks across the Durand Line into Pakistani territory it would further violate Pakistani sovereignty and reduce the chances of furthering an agreement between the two countries on the their mutual border. Copyright ISA. Articles that appear on ISA in the Developing Issues, Conflict Monitor, Oil and Gas Report and Defense Industry Watch are reported and written by ISA's staff of professionals around the world. Publishers are free to reprint ISA content in its original form free of charge, as long as ISA staff are notified in advance and the proper attributions are given. Contact
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